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Unpopularcultures:
The birth of law and popular culture
Steve Redhead
Manchester University Press, 1995, 156 pp.
In Miami Beach, before its recent transformation into a hip world
capital, there was a movie theater whose marquee proclaimed, "Supreme Court
Ruled These Films Not Obscene." I wondered about the porno palace's advertising sense and about its understanding of the relations of law to society. Was
it trying to reassure customers concerned about police harassment? Why didn't
the marquee read "Supreme Court Ruled These Films Legal" or, better, "Supreme Court Ruled These Obscene Films Legal"? Was this porno palace trying
to lure normal people - customers who consume only experiences legally
validated as non-deviant?
Having read Steve Redhead's Unpopular cultures: The birth of law and
popularculture, I have an answer: The people who ran the porno palace weren't
postmodern hip. They weren't as insightful as Luther Campbell, aka Luke
Skywalker, of Miami's 2 Live Crew. He understood the postmodern relations
of law in society: Having the record "As Nasty as U Want 2 Be" declared
obscene by a court sold masses of records. Luther Campbell didn't comply
with the law in search of normal customers. He manipulated law's attempts
to regulate his cultural product and generated an audience which purchased that
which was legally validated as deviant.
The "central thesis" (6) of Unpopular cultures explains Luther Campbell's
insight: With the decreasing salience of other general institutions of socialization, the law is increasingly demanded to define and regulate the normal/
moral (10). The law, however, is but one cultural institution. Unless supported by others, it cannot meet such demands, demands for "hyperlegality" (111).
The law's regulation of cultural forms is increasingly manipulable, as cultures
are internationalizing, rapidly changing both in content and technology (52)
(e.g., it is much easier to close down a porno palace than record sales or sites
on the worldwide web) and as deviant cultures constitute profitable markets.
The unrealizable project of hyperlegality generates "the American dream where
in the 1990s 'the have nots are still making something new' (the hip hop culture
of the streets) while the 'haves are looking back fondly at the 1950s'."(87)
Unpopular cultures cites to works which deal with law's regulation of
cultures and their products. Its bibliography is a most useful compilation of
British writings, although it is a thin record of American writings. Unpopular
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cultures tells us that exciting research is being conducted under the auspices of
the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture, which its author directs.
The method of the book is a telling of academic history: The history
of the intellectual study of the regulation of popular culture. With admirable
self-consciousness, Redhead proposes a history of his discipline that tracks his
own history. Unpopular cultures succeeds as a "text/book" (13) of Redhead's
judgments, while these judgments are not explained in sufficient detail to allow
readers to make their own judgments. The absence of a strong editorial hand
unfortunately prevents the book from realizing its possibilities.
Redhead's own history, and that narrated in the book, is largely confined
to the study of "unpopular", i.e. subaltern, cultures, such as football hooligans.
Those who study such cultures in "postmodernity" have a fundamental problem:
Representatives of these cultures are better able than academic experts to speak
for the culture, rendering the academics superfluous (91).
Such academics, to avoid obsolescence, shifted from studying how law
regulated (oppressed) unpopular groups to studying law as a cultural form, one
way of imagining the real. They began to discuss the "aesthetics of law," its
abilities to define popular desires. This move was not simply opportunistic, but
reflected that academics are in culture. Subject as they are to the "aestheticization and sexualization of everyday life" (4), Redhead argues, academics
must produce a discipline of the "aesthetics and erotics of law" (5). The "erotics
of law" is the study of "the way(s) in which law itself becomes desired, seduced
and consumed." (111)
Were Steve Redhead to visit my law school, he would see an institution
devoted to the erotics of law, although it would blanch at the term. "What
needs to be worked towards is law ..

.

as a popular cultural form," he argues

(108). From a variety of perspectives, many of my colleagues at the University
of Miami Law School are committed to just that project. Redhead suggests this
project is devalued and "unpopular" (1, 108). In America, however, high status
is accorded to the project and the commitment of the University of Miami Law
School to study law in culture is rapidly raising the stature of the school.
Redhead's marginalization is, in part, a product of the differences
between U.S. and British legal education (see Twining). In part, it is a result
of Redhead not having heeded Laura Nader's warnings about the costs of only
studying down (Nader). It is not outsiders only who desire, seduce and consume law. Lawyers do so as well and they can best learn how to practice
(manipulate) law by recognizing that law is not logic, but a form of popular
culture, highly amenable to change. The education students receive at my law
school prepares them not only to recite the "black-letter" law, but also to create
legal change on behalf of their clients (pro bono and fees generating).

Unpopular cultures

359

As Nader argued, those who study only subaltern groups may produce
work which has no "democratic relevance" (Nader: 293). Unpopularcultures is
commendable for its understanding that law is in culture. But recognizing law
as a cultural form is not simply the end of an academic narrative. Democratic
commitments necessarily produce such a recognition.
Redhead uses "unpopular" to denote deviant, outlawed or marginalized.
He never makes it relevant to democratic commitments by equating it with
non-democratic. He never applies it to the law itself. Even in putatively
democratic societies, like Britain or the U.S., it is the legal order which is an
"unpopular culture." Law is not created by popular choice. The state, even
when supposedly speaking as the voice of the people, is engaged in a project
distinct from that of the pop arts.
In our current historical moment, confrontations between legal and
popular cultures are salient. We live in an era of democratic transformation.
This means both that legal orders must be responsive to the different voices of
popular cultures and that legal orders must establish governance structures for
self-defining subjects. Today, the path of the law must not follow logic (truth
not determined by popular choice) but the lived experiences of democratic
peoples. Today, the justifiability of law is determined by substantive legitimacy, by the law in action, in and with popular cultures. Today, "law and
popular culture" means not only "the regulation of popular culture (by law)"
(2) but also the regulation of law by popular culture (see Rosen 1989).
For example, I have argued (Rosen 1990) that academics should shift
their focus from trying to insulate juries from popular culture (media influence,
e.g.) to trying to explain how the jury system works so that jurors forsake what
they know - their culture - and make decisions according to the categories

of an unpopular culture - the law. The 0. J. Simpson verdict, popular media
has proclaimed, demonstrates the law's inabilities to eradicate the common
sense - in this case, a justified suspicion of the police - of jurors. I teach my
students to be skeptical of the idea that the unpopular culture of the law
trumps popular cultures. I teach them that the 0. J. verdict demonstrates both
that a legal team can be worth every penny they are paid and that the job of
lawyers is to teach juries (and others) who think in their own culture to use
legal culture's concepts of "reasonable doubt" and "due process" for state
sanctioned exercises of power. What was so startling about the jury's verdict
in the Simpson case is how quickly they were able to dispense with questions
of factual guilt and address the question demanded by the law: Did the State
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
The jury is a mechanism where democratic sentiments - popular
cultures - have a sanctioned place in the law. In a democratic society, what
Redhead describes, the regulation of subaltern people - the tyranny of the
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majority - is always on the agenda. But so too is the democratic regulation
of the law - popular cultures' regulation of the unpopular culture, the "mysterious science," of the law (Boorstin). Of course, some marginalized groups
deserve marginalization (fascists, e.g.) and some popular cultures (racism, e.g.)
ought not regulate the law. Had Redhead addressed issues of democracy, his
concerns with aesthetics and erotics would have lost some of their ironic charm
but gained in relevance. As we prove at my school, successful lawyers know
that law is in society. It is a cultural form they must learn to manipulate.

Robert Eli Rosen
School of Law
University of Miami
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